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‘Abandonment’ and the Acquisition of Property Rights in 
Separated Human Biomaterials. 
Dr. Neil Maddox1 
 
This paper offers a critique of the concept of ‘abandonment’ when utilised in relation to separated 
human biomaterials. In the absence of the recognition of even limited property rights in the human 
source of such materials, the author contends that utilising abandonment is meaningless and 
misleading. Absurd consequences need not result from recognition of such limited property rights and 
indeed most cases of purported abandonment of human tissue are more akin to voluntary transfers. 
Describing such transfers in terms of abandonment obscures questions as to the agency and the scope 
of the fiduciary duties of medical professionals and researchers.  Income rights in such materials are 
more appropriately determined in reference to normative questions concerning creator incentives, not 
by reference to abandonment. A framework that clearly identified when and in whom original 
property entitlements in the body vest, would help remove any subsequent conceptual confusion about 
the subsequent loss, transfer or abandonment of these entitlements.  
 
1. Introduction 
Modern advances in biotechnology have led to rigorous debate as to how we properly 
regulate biological materials once they have been separated from the person.2 There are 
conflicting views as the usefulness of utilising a property model to deal with these issues.3 
Questions as to the ownership of such separated materials, and in particular whether they 
vests in its source or a subsequent appropriator, such as a medical research institute, have led 
to some notable litigation.4 Broadly, these disputes can be divided into those where the power 
to control the materials is in issue, and those where it is the entitlement to the income from 
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their commercialisation.5 To admit that the source has property rights in their tissue after it 
has been separated from their body, it is feared by some, would impose onerous costs upon 
medical researchers in investigating title, and would impede research.6 To prevent this, so this 
argument goes, the source should be granted no property in their own biological materials.7 
Nonetheless, and somewhat incongruously, a concept derived from property law, that of 
‘abandonment’ has been invoked in this debate in aid of this view.8 
‘Abandonment’ first appears prominently in a report of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in 
1995 on legal and ethical issues relating to human tissue. Somewhat unclearly, the report 
recommended that in any consent to treatment,  tissue removed in the course of that treatment 
would be regarded as abandoned by its source.9  
Such an approach would conveniently preclude the source of any tissue from any subsequent 
claims to it, protecting the hospital and subsequent researchers making use of the tissue from 
having to fend off litigation that might impede the smooth running of the hospital and the 
progress of important medical research.10 In other words, it is a simple and easy way to 
resolve any potential title disputes relating to human tissue. The normative merits of such 
prioritising of third party researchers and hospitals in disputes regarding ownership of human 
tissue are not the focus of this article.11  Instead, I seek to critique utilising the concept of 
abandonment to justify such an approach. There are a number of elements to this. 
First, abandonment is one of those phrases that has different meanings depending on the 
context. When one describes a person ‘abandoning’ their property, (or their tissue, blood or 
sperm sample for that matter), it is not always clear what is meant.12 It can mean, inter alia, 
the abandonment of all claims in respect of a thing, as appeared to be what was meant in the 
Nuffield Report or be employed as a legal term of art to refer to ‘Divesting Abandonment’ a 
concept derived from property law whereby an owner loses ownership of his property if 
divesting abandonment is found to have occurred.13  
                                                          
5M. Quigley, ‘Propertisation and Commercialisation: On Controlling the Uses of Human Biomaterials’ The 
Modern Law Review, 77(5) (2014), pp. 677-702. Both Yearworth v. North Bristol Health Authority [2009] 
EWCA Civ 37 and Holdich v East Lothian Health Authority [2013] SCSOH 197  involved claims for damages 
consequent on interference with control rights of frozen sperm samples that had been destroyed. 
6 Moore [1990] [4a]. 
7 Moore, [1990], [4a]. 
8 Imogen Goold, ‘Abandonment and Human Tissue’ in: Goold, K. et al, ‘Persons, Parts and Property’, pp. 125-
155. Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (1995), [9.14] available at 
http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Human-tissue.pdf <date accessed 21 April 2016>. 
9 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal Issues (1995), [9.14] 
10 The concern to prevent litigation from the source of human tissue that would impede research was of 
paramount concern in the Moore case: Moore [1990] [4a]. 
11 However, see Boulier, ‘Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables’ 23,  Andrews, ‘My Body, My Property’ and 
Goold et al (eds.), Persons, Parts and Property. 
12 Goold, ‘Abandonment and Human Tissue’, pp. 125-155. 
13 Hudson, ‘Is Divesting Abandonment Possible at Common Law?  (1984) LQR 110. 
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Secondly, in property law there are specific requirements that must be met before ‘divesting 
abandonment’ operates and an owner is deemed to have his ownership extinguished: there 
must be loss of de facto physical control, there must be an intention to abandon all rights in 
the property and there must be indifference as to who any subsequent owner might be.14 I 
contend that these requirements are often overlooked when discussing abandonment of 
human tissue, and, further, that if we are to examine these requirements closely, it becomes 
apparent that many cases of purported abandonment of human tissue are more akin to 
voluntary transfers. Incorrectly invoking abandonment obscures this, and also obscures the 
potential remedies available to a source of human tissue consequent on such a finding. 
Thirdly, I contend that is impossible to determine the role that abandonment of ownership or 
legal rights over human tissue, when it is has not been determined where the original 
ownership of such material lies, or how it is determined. I argue that this uncertainty may 
only be resolved by recognising that limited property rights vest in the source of the material. 
Following on from this argument, I contend that the source of human tissue never has income 
rights to them, and thus such rights accrue as windfall wealth, not by virtue of their 
abandonment by their source, the concept here further confusing an already muddled area of 
law. 
This article first sets out the differing meanings of the term ‘Abandonment’ and then 
examines the law relating to the property law concept of divesting abandonment, fleshing out 
is operation and requirements. Then, I examine how ‘abandonment’ has been applied in 
relation to human tissue, critiquing such use in the Nuffield report and I outline the 
inappropriateness of using a line of American Jurisprudence as precedent for a general 
presumption of abandonment. I then set out the difficulty of defining abandonment given the 
uncertainty as to who the original owner of such material is, and then argue that most cases of 
purported abandonment of hospital waste are more akin to voluntary transfers, as there is no 
break in seisin and no ‘roll of the dice’ by their source as to who the subsequent owner might 
be. Furthermore, I discuss how income rights in human materials do not arise by virtue of 
their abandonment by the source, and that invoking abandonment obscures normative 
questions as to where such rights should initially vest. Finally, I argue that an alternative 
framework where limited property rights were granted to the source of human tissue need not 
lead to absurd consequences, and abandonment could be useful in such a framework, as there 
would be expressly identified rights to abandon. 
 
1. Abandonment and Human Bodily Materials 
In the celebrated case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California,15 abandonment is 
not discussed by the court.16 Moore, of course, had consented to  have his tissue removed in 
                                                          
14 L.J. Strahilevitz, ‘The Right to Abandon’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 158 (2010), pp. 355-420. 
15 (1990) 51. Cal. 3d 120. 
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the course of treatment, but not to its subsequent commercialisation. He claimed 
unsuccessfully for conversion of property, indirectly seeking a share in the income rights of 
this commercialisation of his excised tissue. Notwithstanding the absence of any discussion 
of abandonment, the Nuffield Council treated it as authority that in consenting to the 
operation, Moore has abandoned “any claims over the removed tissue”.17 This tenuous 
proposition is doubtful given that Moore had been misled as to the uses that were to be made 
of his cells,18 and it has been contended that any recognition of abandonment would have 
implied that Moore has property in these cells, i.e. an ownership interest to abandon, 
something the majority of the court was anxious to rule out.19  
No English authority was cited in the report justifying the application of abandonment to 
excised human tissue, and in what Matthews described as an “exaggerated respect” paid to 
American judicial decisions, the U.S. case of Venner v. State of Maryland20 is cited for the 
sweeping proposition that there is a general legal presumption in favour of abandonment.21  
Thus, if the source of tissue does not positively assert what is to be done with it once it is 
separated from the body, it is presumed that is abandoned in all cases. It is not difficult to 
conceive scenarios where this would be untrue; for example, in relation to reproductive 
material such as sperm where the source clearly retains an interest in what is done with the 
material after it has left his body. Silence as to the fate of such a material would not lead 
automatically to the conclusion that the source was indifferent to the uses made of it in many 
cases. Yet, this is the presumption advocated by the Nuffield Council. 22 There are also 
difficulties with utilising the American Jurisprudence given their constitutional context, 
discussed below.23 
 
2. Defining ‘Abandonment’ and Distinguishing it from a Voluntary Disposition of 
Property  
The term ‘Abandonment’ may refer to very different things: abandonment of actual or de 
facto possession of a thing, abandonment of ownership of the thing, or abandonment of any 
claims in respect of the thing.24 As we will see, although these criteria sometimes overlap, 
there is a tendency to treat them as inter-changeable which is not correct. For instance, the 
abandonment of any claims in respect of a thing would probably encompass claims that arise 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16 In the dissent by Broussard J., he talks of a patient abandoning any claim to an organ once has donated it for 
general research purposes, but abandonment of ownership is no-where discussed, (1990) 51. Cal. 3d 120, p. 153. 
17 Nuffield Council, ‘Human Tissue’, [9.12]. 
18 Yearworth v. North Bristol NHS Trust [2009] 3 W.L.R. 118, [40].  
19 Matthews, ‘The Man of Property’, p. 268. 
20 (1976) 354 A 2d 483 (Md CA). 
21 Nuffield Council, ‘Human Tissue’, [9.8]; Matthews, ‘The Man of Property’ , p. 268. 
22 Matthews, ‘The Man of Property’, p. 265. 
23 Goold, ‘Abandonment’, p. 136 (fn 62). 
24 Goold, ‘Abandonment and Human Tissue’, pp. 126-129. 
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by virtue of ownership of that thing. As Goold notes, there can be some confusion between a 
lay-understanding of abandonment and a lawyer’s: to abandon something in general parlance 
is ‘to give it up...we mean we are no longer interested in it.’25 In addition, a non-lawyer 
without further thought on the matter may assume that abandoning possession of an object is 
always the same as abandoning ownership of it, but of course this is not always the case. 
While possession is an important feature of property, it is not a necessary one, and one may 
lose possession of an object without losing ownership of it. This is an important distinction to 
note when examining cases relating to the purported abandonment of human tissue. In the 
famous case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California, for example, question arose 
as to the rights that the Plaintiff retained if in his excised spleen (i.e. once he has lost 
possession of it). The Nuffield report suggested that he ‘abandoned’ any claims in respect of 
it by consenting to the operation to remove it.    
However, if one examines the law relating to the transfer of ownership in chattels, the 
circumstances in which a loss of physical possession of an object lead to an inference that it 
has been abandoned are quite limited. Instead, complexity and uncertainty arise once 
exclusive physical control is lost. While giving up physical possession does not necessarily 
mean that ownership is lost, there are, according to Pollock and Wright in their leading work 
on possession, a possible ‘infinite combination of facts’ between having an intention to retain 
legal ownership in the thing and wishing to abandon all rights in it.26 Thus, one cannot 
assume abandonment once control is lost unless the individual facts of the case are examined 
and there are many possible solutions, of which abandonment is but one. Voluntary 
dispossession in favour of another is delivery, while quiting possession without any specific 
intention of putting another in your place, according to Pollock and Wright, is 
abandonment.27This distinction is important. For delivery to take place, the relinquishing 
party contemplates the identity of the subsequent  taker of the  property; whereas, a party 
purporting to abandon the property is indifferent to the identity of any person who may 
become the subsequent owner. Thus, in abandonment, as Strahileviz notes, the relinquishing 
owner “rolls the dice” as to who the subsequent owner might be.28 With this in mind, it 
becomes clearer when the term abandonment is used inappropriately. I may ‘abandon’ my 
house when the mortgage becomes unsustainable, I do not likely intend putting the house ‘up 
for grabs’ in a free for all. Rather, I am abandoning it to my creditors, a situation more akin to 
a transfer by operation of law.29 Delivery is possible by handing over a chattel with an intent 
to transfer ownership. However, such a delivery may be made, as Pollock and Wright 
observe, with intent to transfer:  
“...a more limited right, including the right to use or have control of that 
object...There may be cases of handing over for a limited purpose ... It must depend 
                                                          
25 Goold, ‘Abandonment and Human Tissue’, p. 126 
26 Pollock and Wright, ‘Possession’, p. 37 and p. 124. 
27 Pollock and Wright, ‘Possession’, pp. 40-41. 
28 Strahilevitz, ‘The Right to Abandon’, pp. 355-420. 
29 Strahilevitz, ‘The Right to Abandon’, p. 377. 
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on the true intent of the transaction...whether there is a bailment or a mere authority 
or licence to deal with the thing in a certain way.”30 
While possession is given up in all cases of delivery, it is the intent of the outgoing possessor 
that is the crucial element in the extent of the incoming possessors enjoyment and control.31 
As will be discussed below, many circumstances in which hospital waste comes into the 
possession of a medical or research institution might be more readily characterised as a 
voluntary transfer, and not as abandonment. 
In addition to a loss of de facto possession, for legal abandonment to occur the owner must 
form an intention to unilaterally divest himself of ownership of the goods and any power to 
exclude others from exercising ownership rights over them.32 This is called ‘divesting 
abandonment’.33 The meaning of divesting abandonment is more than that implied when 
talking of discarding an object, the latter simply referring to a loss of possession. One may 
look to the taking of an abandoned thing as original acquisition or occupation.34 This is quite 
a rigorous requirement, the intention to abandon all rights over a thing as well as giving up 
possession of it. Clearly, one is likely to give the matter more thought if it a part of their body 
(even a small part contains a person entire genetic code) that they are discarding, as opposed 
to an old newspaper or used coffee cup.   
If one loses property without divesting intention, there is no abandonment, and this is the case 
even if the search for the item is abandoned.35As one judge noted: “One does not abandon 
property merely because one has forgotten where one put it.”36 It is difficult to imagine how 
likely a distressed or unconscious patient is to form such a specific intention. 
As can be seen from this discussion, determining the intention of the true owner at the time 
that de facto possession of the res was parted with is of paramount importance in determining 
if abandonment has occurred. Obviously, this presents a practical difficulty in that the true 
owner may not be traceable, and evidence of intention will have to be garnered from the 
surrounding circumstances. The value and nature of the goods are relevant to the issue. It is 
unlikely that goods of high monetary or sentimental value were intended to be abandoned by 
their owner.37 On both counts, an engagement ring is likely to have been lost; whereas a 
newspaper left behind at a train station is likely to have been abandoned. Where the costs of 
retaining ownership of an item begin to greatly outweigh the benefits, this may justify an 
inference that the goods were abandoned.38 Furthermore, abandonment of de facto possession 
may be to enable delivery of an item by way of gift, as when items are left outside of a 
                                                          
30 Pollock and Wright, ‘Possession’, p. 58 
31 Pollock and Wright, ‘Possession’, p. 41. 
32 Goold, ‘Abandonment and Human Tissue’, p. 126. 
33 Hudson, ‘Is Divesting Abandonment Possible at Common Law?’, p.110.  
34 Pollock and Wright, ‘Possession’, p. 124. 
35 Moffat v. Kazana [1969] 2 QB 152. 
36 Wrangham J., Moffat v. Kazana [1969], p. 156. See also Merry v. Green (1803) 8 Ves  405. 
37 S. Thomas, ‘Do Freegans Commit Theft’ Legal Studies 30(1) (2010) 98, p. 106; R v. Peters (1843) 1 Car & K 
245, p. 247; 174 ER 795. 
38 In Bentinck Limited v. Cromwell Engineering Company [1971] 1 QB 324. 
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charity store, for example.39 Of course, the human body has differing kinds of value, 
monetary, functional and sentimental, and all of these militate against a presumption of 
abandonment occurring for many types of tissue.  
One could of course argue that most tissue left behind by patients in a hospital is waste, or 
garbage, and can be considered abandoned by its source. Nonetheless, an examination of the 
case-law in relation to whether there can be theft of garbage in criminal law throws up a more 
nuanced view. Rubbish is not usually valuable (and clearly not valuable to the person 
disposing of it) and abandonment can be more easily presumed for garbage than for objects 
of value. In treating something as rubbish and disposing of it, one shows an intention,  prima 
facie at least, to abandon it. This is not always the case, however. R v. Edwards and Stacey40 
provides authority to the effect that an  intention to permanently deprive oneself of de facto 
possession of an object does not constitute  abandonment of ownership. The accused had 
been prosecuted for digging up  diseased pig carcases which had been buried by their owner. 
The court held that the owner of the pig heads, which were a threat to public health, had 
retained an intention to control them by leaving them permanently in the ground.41  
In Williams v. Phillips,42 a larceny conviction for the theft of public bins was upheld with the 
court holding that putting rubbish out for collection does not constitute abandonment. Refuse 
had been placed in the dustbins for the specific purpose of being collected and taken away by 
the local authority and passed into the constructive possession of the local authority as soon 
as it was placed in their carts.43 As there was no gap in seisin and legal possession of the 
goods had not been parted with, this was a case more akin to a voluntary transfer in that one 
is relinquishing possession to another with the intention to transfer ownership. It can hardly 
then be said that the owner had abandoned the rubbish to the world generally, as would have 
been necessary for abandonment. 
 
3. The U.S. Cases: Privacy Decoupled from Property 
As noted, the Nuffield Council, relayed heavily on the precdential value of the American case 
of Venner to justify advocating that an extremely broad presumption that tissue is abandoned 
once it has been separated from its source, unless the source expressly states what is to be 
done with it.44 While the failure of the Nufflield council to look for other precedent has been 
criticised elsewhere,45 I would note an additional problem with using the line of case-law of 
which Venner forms part as authority, as ‘abandonment’ in those cases now bears little 
resemblance to the property law concept of abandonment.  
                                                          
39 R.(on the application of Ricketts) v. Basildon Magistrates’ Court [2010] EWHC 2358.  
40 (1877) 13 Cox CC 384. 
41 Cf. Haynes’ Case (1614) 12 Co Rep 113, 77 ER 1389. 
42 (1957) 41 Cr App R 5. 
43 Williams v. Phiilips (1957) 41 Cr App R 5. 
44 Nuffield Council, Human Tissue [9.8]. 
45 Matthews, The Man of Property, p. 268. 
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The reason for this is related to the  fact that these cases concerned questions of American 
Constitutional law regarding the seizure of evidence, and were not simply disputes as to the 
title to goods. In the U.S. Constitution, the Fourth  Amendment prohibits  certain types of 
searches and seizures; however, the amendment does not protect against the seizure of 
‘abandoned’ property.46 Thus, abandonment is here invoked in disputes concerning the 
admission of evidence in a criminal trial, a very different context from a normal dispute over 
ownership of a chattel that is supposedly abandoned. Pursuant to Katz v. United States,47 
police activity only constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment if in 
the circumstances the defendant exhibits a reasonable expectation of privacy, and if that 
expectation is one recognised objectively as reasonable. A seizure of a person’s property 
occurs if there is a meaningful interference with a person’s possessory interests in it.48 The 
court in Katz noted that: “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection...but what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”49 Thus, property ‘abandoned’ by its owner does not constitute such a search or 
seizure and is outside of the protection of the Fourth Amendment. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. courts have moved away from a property based approach, i.e. one  
where a defendant could successfully invoke Fourth Amendment protection by establishing 
there had been no divesting abandonment of the property in issue. 50 In a criminal context, 
allowing such an easy objection to the search and seizure of property would be undesirable. A 
defendant would merely have to assert that they had formed no intention to divest themselves 
of ownership of their goods, even where they had abandoned de facto physical control of 
them.  Instead, the courts began to focus on the privacy implications of the search and seizure 
in determining if the Fourth Amendment applied.51  
This has resulted in a somewhat muddled de-coupling of the issue of abandonment from its 
basis in property law. Somewhat unclearly, the “issue is not abandonment in the strict 
property-right sense...but whether the person prejudiced by the search had voluntarily 
discarded, left behind, or otherwise relinquished his interest in the property in question so that 
he could no longer retain a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to it at the time of 
the search.”52 Better, perhaps, if the courts focused exclusively on the question of privacy and 
ignored the property aspect altogether. Nonetheless, the language of property is still utilised, 
                                                          
46 E.E. Joh, ‘Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy’ Northwestern 
University Law Review 100 (2006), p. 857. 
47 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).   
48 United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
49 Katz  (1967), p. 351. 
50 U.S. v. Cowan 396 F.2d 83 (2nd Cir. 1968), pp. 86-87.  
51 U.S. v. Colbert  474 F.2d 174 (5th Cir, 1973). 
52 U.S. v. Colbert  (1973); U.S. v. Edwards 441 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1971); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 
(1988), 38; United States v. Mustone, 469 F. 2d 970 (1st Cir. 1972). 
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often incorrectly.53 It is not at all clear, however, what, if any, are the elements of this new 
doctrine of ‘abandonment’.  
The most prominent case involving abandonment of bodily materials and the Fourth 
Amendment, and the one cited in the Nuffield Report as authority for the proposition that one 
could abandon such materials, is Venner v. State of Maryland.54 Venner concerned whether 
drugs found in the excrement of an unconscious hospital patient was admissible in evidence 
in his subsequent trial. Admitting the evidence, the court indicated that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect material that was “once owned, possessed, or controlled by an 
accused, but which comes into the possession of the police after it has been abandoned or 
otherwise relinquished by him.”55 It was further noted that there could be no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the excrement. However, the appellant in Venner was admitted to 
the hospital in a semi-conscious and impaired state. The extent to which the abandonment 
was volitional is open to question, and the trail of hair, skin cells etc. that every person leaves 
behind them every day can hardly be described as volitional at all. Such loss of possession of 
our cells “cannot be avoided unless one is a hermit or is fanatical in using extraordinary 
containment measures.”56 Had the reasonable expectation of privacy test not been decoupled 
from it roots in property law, then, it would have been very difficult to infer an intention to 
abandon in these circumstances. One could argue that the question of abandonment in these 
cases has been wholly subsumed in the question as to whether there was a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. In any event, it can be seen that it is wholly inappropriate to utilise 
this line of cases as authority for the existence of a (property-law) doctrine of divesting 
abandonment of human bodily materials, given that it is questionable whether property law is 
an issue in any of these decisions at all. 
4. The Nature of ‘Property’ in the Body 
(a) The body is ‘mere property’ at best 
 In Honoré’s famous conception, possession (i.e. exclusive physical control of a thing) forms 
just one of the standard incidents of ownership, albeit an important one.57 Rights of use, 
management, income, transfer, alienation and destruction are among those listed alongside 
possession.58 According to Honoré, none of the individual incidents are necessary or 
sufficient for ownership.59 Thus, the absence or loss of a right of possession is not 
determinative of the absence or loss of all property rights in a thing. It is easier to intuit this 
                                                          
53 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, (1960) 241. See also: Hester v. U.S. 265 U.S. 57 (1924), 58; U.S. v. 
Cowan, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).   
54Venner v. State of Maryland  30 Md. App. 599 (1976); Nuffield Council, ‘Human Tissue’, [9.8]. 
55 Venner (1976), pp. 617-624. Applying Robinson v. State, 13 Md. App. 439, 283 A. 2d 637 (1971). 
56 E.J. Imwinkelried & DH Kaye, ‘DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues’ Washington Law Review 76 
(2001), p. 413, 437-438. 
57 A.M. Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in: A.G. Guest, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: a Collaborative Work (London: 
OUP, 1961), pp. 107-147. 
58 Honoré, ‘Ownership’, pp. 107-147. 
59 Honoré ‘Ownership’, pp. 112-113. 
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for real property than for chattels. Few would dispute that a landlord is the ‘owner’ of his 
property, even though he has contracted away his right to possession to his tenant for a fixed 
period. Thus, when one examines it closely ‘ownership’ is a much more complex 
phenomenon that would first appear. As identified by Honoré, there are many different rights 
that may vest in an owner, and as these rights need not vest exclusively in one person, 
property has many potential owners. Nevertheless, it is typical to think of property as having 
one owner in whom unlimited powers of control and transmission vest , what has been 
described as ‘full blooded ownership’.60 It is tempting to think that all owners of property 
have such full-blooded ownership of it, but this is not correct. Professor Harris conceives of 
the ‘ownership spectrum’ whereby ownership is by degrees. At the upper end of the spectrum 
is full blooded ownership where limits on use, control and transmission are only limited to 
the extent that they infringe some property independent prohibition.61 At the lower end is 
what he defines as ‘mere property’ which embraces use privileges as well as powers of 
control over the uses made by others.62 It does not include transmissibility which is only a 
necessary feature of ownership in the case of money. The concept of ‘mere property’ is 
relevant when we examine how to characterise separated body-parts as property. According 
to a number of commentators, justifactory arguments for property do not yield full-blooded 
ownership vesting in the source of separated body parts.63, but an entitlement further down 
the ownership spectrum more akin to ‘mere property’. Few would doubt I am free to use my 
body, and the control the use of it made by others (the ‘bodily-use freedom principle’) and 
that this use and control is protected by laws prohibiting bodily security. Arguments for the 
recognition of ‘mere property’ in separated body parts are an extension of this principle: that 
which was formerly protected by laws preserving bodily-integrity is now protected by vesting 
property in the source once the material has been separated from the body. However, because 
exploitative powers of transmission did not apply to the tissue before it was excised, the fact 
of its separation cannot have created them.64  
(b) Uncertainty as to the Original Owner of human tissue 
To determine the role that the concept of abandonment plays in relation to human body parts, 
Goold notes, we must determine who the original owner of the material is.65 This is not easily 
resolved. Much, if not all, of the conceptual confusion in this area comes from the old 
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common law rule that there is no property in the body.66 Notwithstanding the fact that this 
rule was likely based on a misreading of the early cases, it would seem too well established to 
do away with.67 Thus, attempts to justify property in human biological materials are, 
impliedly at least, framed as exceptions to this general rule. Not being a res, anything 
attached to the complete living body is not property and not owned. There must, in Penner’s 
view, be some separation between the material and the person before human tissue can be 
‘property’.68 On separation from the body then, the separated material, although unowned, 
becomes something capable of being owned, i.e. capable of being a res.69  
This leads to the conceptualisation of separated human materials as res nullius, and belonging 
to no-one until brought under dominion.70 In essence, the first person to exercise control over 
the material would be its owner. Unless this was the source of the material, ownership would 
fall to the first person who took possession of it. Such an approach is a logically consistent 
extension of the no-property rule. However, the consequences of adopting such an approach 
render the language of donation and the “gift-relationship” nonsensical. How can a purported 
donor of property make a gift of an organ or tissue if they do not own it? As Laurie and 
Matthews have noted, describing such transfers in these terms implies that their source has 
property in their own body and its products.71  In a similar vein, we cannot talk of a patient 
abandoning tissue, in the sense of a legal divesting abandonment, if they had no title to it in 
the first place. But what rights can the source have in the material if not property rights?72 It 
has been suggested the source of the material would be estopped from seeking their return.73 
Lord Denning M.R. famously defined estoppel as being if a person: 
“ ... by his words or conduct, so behaves as to lead another to believe that he will 
not insist on his legal rights knowing or intending that the other will act on that 
belief—and he does so act, that again will raise an equity in favour of the 
other...”74 
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Of course, it is implicit in this statement that the person will have legal rights that they could 
insist on and that they have lead another to believe they will not insist on. However, it is not 
at all clear what legal rights the source would be estopped from asserting in the absence of 
the recognition that they had some sort of property right in their own tissue.  
Implicit in the categorisation of excised material as res nullius is an assumption that an 
operating doctor removes any tissue in an independent capacity from its donor.75 If a medical 
professional is engaged by me to perform a service involving excising tissue on my behalf 
and for my benefit, then it is a doubtful that they would immediately have a better claim to 
the excised tissue than me.76 This is an important point. In the recent Australian case of 
Estate of the Late Mark Edwards,77 Mr. Edwards had planned to donate sperm to undergo  
IVF with his wife but had died unexpectedly before the procedure. His wife sought and was 
granted an emergency court order to extract sperm from her husband’s body. The procedure 
was held to apply the necessary work/skill to the material to make it property (under the 
exception espoused in Dodeward v. Spence) but it was held to belong to the wife and not the 
physician who performed the procedure “as the samples were removed on her behalf, and for 
her purposes, and “no-one else in the world had any interest in them”.78 While legal questions 
concerning ownership of biomaterials usually focus on the intentions (presumed or actual) of 
their source, this case is illustrative of the often overlooked question as to the capacity in 
which the doctor is acting vis-á-vis the patient.  
Additionally, Dickens imagines a scenario where a limb or digit is severed in an industrial 
accident. The source’s interest in retrieving the severed body-part and having it quickly re-
attached surgically “should not be impaired by the chance of the item falling upon another’s 
land or being retrieved and retained by a stranger not implicated in causing the loss.”79 He 
advocates granting the source a prior superior right in the form of an inchoate right (which he 
describes  as a ‘right in prospect’ which may become fully constituted if the material in 
question becomes separated from the body) so that traditional legal tests of intention, 
possession and control might be preserved when considering ownership.80  
Others argue that we should simply treat the body as another form of property to cut through 
the conceptual confusion.81 Granting property rights, or even inchoate property rights, that 
are prior to the claims of any subsequent purported owner of the material solves another 
difficulty. As Hickey notes, a trespassing finder’s rights are not affected by virtue of the 
trespass, and although liable for the trespass their title can only be defeated by a person 
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showing a better (i.e. a prior, possessory) title.82 One could interpret the Moore case in this 
way; the initial failure to obtain Moore’s consent to the use of his tissue for research did not 
prevent the researchers from obtaining title to his tissue, although they were still liable for the 
initial lack of informed consent. If this is the law, then it incentivises an absurd free-for-all 
whereby a person could wrongfully appropriate a person’s tissue (in breach of their bodily 
integrity, for instance) and yet claim better title to it than its source and defeat any action for 
its return or disposal.83  
Acknowledging that the source of the material has a prior right to it, such a mischief is 
avoided. Of course, such a right need not be full-blooded ownership and may amount to a 
more circumscribed property right such as Professor Harris’s ‘mere property’, an extension of 
the bodily-use freedom principle discussed below.84 Such an approach need not place undue 
costs upon hospital researchers since such a right could be abandoned, as the traditional tests 
of ownership— intention, possession and control—would be preserved.85 Until that is 
position, it is clear that invoking ‘abandonment’ is meaningless: it is like placing a fig leaf on 
a eunuch.  
5. Many Cases of Purported Abandonment of Human Tissue More Akin to Delivery   
There is a further conceptual difficulty in finding divesting abandonment by the source of 
tissue in cases involving human materials appropriated during a medical procedure: there is 
rarely a gap in seisin. In fact, there is a definite chain of possession starting with the source of 
the material, then moving to the doctor who removes it, then on to the nurses and other 
assistants before ending with the pathologist.86 This can hardly be characterised as an 
abandonment to the world at large as there is no loss of possession at any time as would be 
present in a true abandonment.87 It is more akin to a voluntary transfer, i.e. a gift. 
Furthermore, all interest in the tissue must be abandoned simultaneously with the act of 
abandonment and given the forensic, diagnostic and reproductive uses which even a small 
sample of human tissue may be put, it is doubtful that the source of such materials, by their 
silence, intends to abandon all such rights over them, thereby allowing the hospital assume 
absolute ownership of the material to use as they please.88  
Indeed, the source of samples will often fail to aver to the type of use that may subsequently 
be made of them. For instance, in Moore the Plaintiff claimed that his consent was to the 
removal of his spleen for therapeutic purposes, and that consent did not include subsequent 
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commercial exploitation.89 As McHale notes, one person’s waste may be another’s raw 
material.90 Nonetheless, the implications of treating human tissue as abandoned are much 
broader than for other more usual forms of waste. For instance, the fact that every cell in the 
human body can reveal a person’s genetic code means that an enormous quantity of 
information can be obtained about a person (and their family) if a DNA analyses is 
performed.91 In Venner, things such as “excrement, fluid waste, secretions, hair, fingernails, 
toenails” were considered abandoned on separation from the body according to the court, by 
force of “human custom and experience”.92 However, in light of developments in DNA and 
drug analyses technology, describing such materials as abandoned for all purposes seems 
inappropriate. Custom may dictate that we abandon human waste on separation from our 
body, but this hardly includes an authorisation to perform DNA or drug analyses on it. 
When parting with a tissue, a person is often unaware of its potential value. Skene draws an 
analogy with abandoning a piece of furniture without knowing if it had commercial potential 
or not.93 This appears analogous to the principle of mistake in contract law where a mistake 
as to the value of an object that is not shared by another party is not legally relevant.94 If I 
purchase a ring believing it to be made of gold, I cannot rescind the contract on the grounds 
of mistake since my mistake does not relate to the terms of the contract which are to purchase 
a specific ring. Caveat Emptor applies and this is not affected by the fact that the vendor 
knew of my mistake, or that it is clear I would not have entered into the contract had I 
realised it.95 Furthermore, mistake implies a positive belief that is incorrect and failure to aver 
to an issue (such as the value of an object) is not sufficient for the relief to be granted.96 
Furthermore, there is a general rule in contract law that mere non-disclosure cannot constitute 
misrepresentation.97  
Nevertheless, abandoning furniture to a skip or giving it to a rag and bone man is very 
different to having tissue excised by one’s attending physician during the course of medical 
treatment. In addition to the legal presumption of undue influence, there is also a fiduciary 
relationship between a doctor and patient.98 As such, there is an exception to the general rule 
that non-disclosure cannot constitute misrepresentation. Even if any engagement with a 
patient is on behalf of a hospital or a research institute, these bodies act through the physician 
as their agent.99 A physician, being a medical specialist, is clearly in a better position to 
assess the potential monetary value of any tissue taken than the patient themselves.100 Let us 
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not forget that Skene argues a mistake as to value should not affect an abandonment, i.e. a 
divesting of goods with an intention to abandon them to the world at large. Mistake, 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure imply a voluntary transfer between parties who know 
each other, i.e. not in the nature of abandonment. Incorrectly applying ‘abandonment’ to 
transactions involving voluntary exchange serves to obscure the potential remedies that may 
be available to the source of material for breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty.   
Furthermore, as is evident from the case-law relating to abandonment and larceny, disposing 
of an object as trash is not conclusive of the formation of intention to abandon: one may 
intend to make a voluntary transfer to the bin-man of the rubbish for collection,101 or retain an 
intention to control it (in a negative sense) as being permanently disposed of.102 
6. Abandonment, Income Rights and Windfall Wealth 
Of course, discussions as to how we allocate property rights so as to protect the interests of 
their source can often omit the right to derive income from the exploitation of these 
materials.103 The source of such tissue may care little what is done with it until they discover 
it has been commercialised. This sheds light on a problem with regard to hospital waste. It is 
difficult to determine if something is waste or not as its value may be contingent on the 
actions of others. I may be happy to allow my excised spleen be used as a teaching aid in a 
medical school or simply incinerated without any further thought. However, if it is to be used 
in research with commercial potential this may motivate me to consider it as my property.104 
As McHale notes, what constitutes waste is relative and needs to be considered in context: 
“one person’s waste can be another person’s raw material.”105 An old newspaper, for 
instance, may have value for a recycling company or to shelter a vagrant. For ordinary 
chattels, there would seem to present little difficulty. If the newspaper was discarded in 
circumstances where one could infer an intention to abandon, the next person appropriating it 
would become its owner irrespective of the use they decide to make of it. If the object is 
valuable, however, such as a bracelet, there would be no presumption of abandonment as it 
would most likely have been lost.  
A mistake as to the value of an abandoned object by the person abandoning it does not affect 
abandonment (or a voluntary transfer) once the necessary intention is formed. A similar 
outcome would also apply to property which has contingent value. If a company makes 
money selling products produced with my recycled trash, I can hardly call for a share of the 
profits.106 Nonetheless, different considerations apply when it is abandonment of human 
biological materials in issue. 
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So, for example, in Moore the plaintiff’s failure to aver to the actual or contingent value of 
his cells would not affect his loss of ownership, nor would the subsequent use made of them 
by the researchers. Herein lies the rub. Such an approach implies ownership by the source 
that is lost or abandoned; and in the Moore case this would have included income rights.  
Similar thinking is involved in the incongruous recommendation of the Nuffield Council that 
donated tissue be regarded as a ‘gift’, clearly implying the source has property rights to give, 
while at the same time denying the source has such rights by invoking the ‘no property in the 
body’ rule.107 Yet that rule is then disregarded and property in these parts will emerge 
“further down the line” for valuable biotechnological products, or for preserved samples that 
are used in teaching and research.108 Thus the notion of ‘abandonment’ is applied in a partial 
and haphazard manner to vest ownership in subsequent  appropriators, while denying it to the 
source.  
Of course, it is not strictly correct to say that a person has ‘no property’ in their body. 
Intuitively, we have some rights over our bodies reflected in body-ownership rhetoric such as 
referring to “My Body”.109 Yet, it is not “my” body, in the same way that my car is “my” car. 
If we conceive of ownership in terms of Honoré’s standard incidents, these can be broadly 
divided into control rights and income rights.110 A person’s interest in the living body 
comprises the former, but not the latter, what Professor Harris conceived of as “mere 
property”: “the notion that something pertaining to a person is, maybe within drastic limits, 
his to use as he pleases and therefore his to permit others to use gratuitously or for exchanged 
favours.”111  
These rights do not include the right to derive income from the thing (e.g. I may donate an 
organ, but not sell it). Indeed, there is academic support for the view that there can be no 
expressive justification for income rights given that they are conditional on external market 
conditions.112 The power to donate one’s body to medical research, for instance, would be 
regarded as an extension of the “bodily-use freedom principle”, rather than related to any 
powers of transmissibility.113 Such freedoms over the complete body are protected by a right 
to bodily integrity (prohibition of assault, for example), and an argument could be made that 
severed parts, the recently severed finger, belong to the source, not as a chattel over which 
one has full-blooded ownership, but as an extension of this principle.  
This reflects the reality that income rights in separated human biomaterials are not transferred 
by “gift” or “abandoned” by the source, but are “windfall wealth” that Harris argues should 
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accrue to the community.114  Windfall wealth is a new item of social wealth to which no-one 
in the community has a better claim than anyone else.115 Arguably, income rights in separated 
human biomaterials are such wealth as they did not exist prior to such separation (their source 
having ‘mere property’ at best in their body). Once separated, any right to their commercial 
exploitation is thus a windfall, as such rights did not exist prior to their separation. Thus, the 
source of such materials has no better claim than anybody else to the income rights in them, 
since these rights never vested in them, and they did not lose them. The question as to where 
such a windfall should land is normative and for property-specific justice reasons, according 
to Harris, preference is given to share such wealth with the community (or a public agency 
acting on its behalf). Nonetheless, one can justify conferring windfall wealth on private 
individuals if you do so pursuant to a simple rule that can save costs. For example, of one 
regards the title obtained by an adverse possessor of property as windfall wealth, ideally it 
should accrue to the community. This is impractical and costly, however, and conferring title 
on an adverse possessor in the form of the adverse possessor is a low cost way of providing 
incentives for investment in the property.116 In Moore, the court indicated that to find for the 
plaintiff in conversion would confer would allow him to recover a “highly theoretical 
windfall”, the implication being that to confer such a windfall on a private individual would 
be undesirable.117 Yet, the California court went on to confer the windfall on a private 
enterprise in the form of the research institute. The possibility that the windfall ought to 
accrue to the community was not even considered by the court in Moore.  
Viewing  income rights in such materials as windfall wealth can illuminate what is really at 
issue in recent notable cases. The source may contend, as happened in Moore, that the 
windfall should more appropriately accrue to them. Alternatively, in line with Harris’s view, 
the source may argue that the windfall should accrue to the community. In the U.S. case of 
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital the plaintiff donors of tissue brought an action 
against the defendant hospital who had been the recipient of the tissue, when the latter 
commenced charging licensing fees and imposed restrictions for the use of a genetic test 
developed in the course of the research. The plaintiffs contended that the donation had been 
made on the understanding that the results would be for the benefit of the general population, 
and that testing would be affordable and within the public domain 
If one accepts this argument that income rights in these materials are windfall wealth, they do 
not vest in the hospital or research institute by virtue of their abandonment or gift by their 
source. They are a new right and were not the source’s to give. Use of such language suggests 
in disputes as to who owns separated human tissue misleadingly imply that these are disputes 
where is there is privity between the parties with regard to these income rights, when in fact 
they are seeking to assert ownership over a new right. Simply conferring ownership on a 
private hospital or research institution without a consideration of the merits vesting them in 
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some agency acting on behalf of the community, “designed to swell the public coffers” as 
Harris says,118 is regrettable. 
7. Possession, Policy and Absurd Consequences 
There are conflicting policy goals that involve the issue of ‘abandonment’ and human 
biomaterials. This conflict has been examined by contrasting the respective merits of 
allowing an easy or automatic presumption of abandonment versus disallowing the 
presumption, or severely limiting the circumstances in which it can apply.119 Allowing 
abandonment be easily presumed, it is contended,  provides security of ownership to a 
researcher once they take possession of the biomaterial.120 It is argued that without such an 
easy presumption of abandonment researchers would be exposed to potential conversion 
claims unless they incurred the significant cost of determining ownership of each biological 
sample they used.121 An elaboration of this view is the  objection to property in the body 
because of the ‘absurd consequences’ that would seemingly result. For example, dropping 
hair in a public place could lead to a finding that you were littering, a hospital would have to 
ensure consent to bodily waste being disposed of,122 and a bequest of ‘all my property to my 
son’ would not only entitle the beneficiary to the deceased’s body and possessions but also 
the body and other tissue.123  
This approach assumes in all cases of statutory and testamentary construction, that the type of 
property recognised in the body would meet the definition of ‘property’ in a criminal statute, 
or that a court would interpret a testator’s devise of property to incorporate such matters as 
her body or excised tissue, unlikely, one would think unless expressly stated. Textbook 
writers consider in detail the presumption in statutory interpretation that a legislature did not 
intend absurd consequences to result from legislation, unless this stated in very plain 
language.124 In particular, interpretations which are unworkable or impractical or “productive 
of a disproportionate counter-mischief” are to be avoided.125 A prosecution for littering in 
shedding hair would surely fall into this category.  In Hecht v. Superior Court,126 a case 
involving a purported bequest of sperm, it is easy to misstate the key issue for determination 
by that court as whether sperm was property or not. In fact, it was whether sperm was 
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property for the purposes of the California Succession Statute applicable in that case, a much 
more limited dicta.127  
Furthermore, one has control rights in the body and control rights do not necessarily lead to 
property.128 The body has been described as property sui generis,129 ‘mere property’,130 or an 
‘interim’ category,131 none of which may meet the definition of ‘property’ in every context, 
as they are more limited forms of ownership.132 As such, the ‘absurd consequences’ argument 
tends give in to the tendency to conflate more limited property interests with full-blooded 
ownership.133 Even if a conversion claim were successful, damages in many cases 
contemplated by this argument (a lost hair or flake of skin)  would be negligible.134 There 
may be exceptions nonetheless, such as where interference with use and control rights causes 
significant damage to the source, such as for the unauthorised use, or loss of destruction of 
gametes.135 
Additionally, the ‘absurd consequences’ argument assumes incorrectly that all cases of theft 
and conversion are treated the same by the courts. When determining the issue of possession 
for the resolution of a dispute, judges have some flexibility to further policy goals. This is 
clear from the fact that, while the issue of abandonment is found in discreet areas of law (law 
of wreck, criminal law, law of personal property), it’s application differs depending on the 
context.  For instance, to state that “Abandonment will not lightly be inferred” as a blanket 
proposition and not one restricted to cases of larceny is incorrect. Possession is not a fixed 
concept and possession will be found in some cases and not in others, notwithstanding factual 
similarities.136 For example, the lack of a specific knowledge of the location or existence of a 
chattel or the absence of a particular intention with regard to it is not necessarily fatal to a 
finding that one has possession of it.137  
Possession, in D.R. Harris’s view, is flexible and functional with a limited discretion vested 
in judges in marginal cases to effect policy goals with their decision. There is a list of factors 
that judge’s have regard to (namely, the physical control and knowledge and intention of the 
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supposed owner and any rival claimant) and no single factor is determinative.138 Thus, judges 
“subconsciously” compare the facts before them with the perfect pattern of possession to see 
if they are sufficiently analogous to give the plaintiff the remedy sought.139 Thus, judges have 
discretion to recognise possession (analogous to a finding of reasonableness) and will permit 
further departures from the ideal concept of possession to further justice and social policy 
goals.140 The very great leeway afforded to “owners’ in cases of larceny lies then in the 
policy of the law to convict dishonest person’s when possible.”141 One must be cautious then 
in generalising  that the law of ‘abandonment’ in, for instance, the criminal law (where the 
punishment of dishonest conduct is a policy goal) will operate identically in another discreet 
area of law such as for conversion of human tissue, were one would assume courts would 
tend towards avoidance of absurd consequences.  
Alternatively, it has been contended that allowing abandonment be presumed too easily 
would insufficiently protect the interests that the source retains in their excised tissue.142 As 
noted, when an object of value, such as a wallet or gold bracelet, is found a court is likely to 
presume it is lost and not abandoned.143 However, where the found item has no value or is 
found in circumstances that suggest it was intentionally discarded, an intention to abandon is 
more likely to be inferred. A res may have value in the market, i.e. an objective economic 
value, or subjective value, i.e. objects that may not have a market value but hold personal 
significance for the individual and is associated with their personhood.144 Separated human 
biomaterials can hold both types of value. In the former category, there are a number of cases 
involving disputes over the source’s entitlement to income rights in the products of medical 
research made from their biomaterials.145 In the second category, there are products that have 
personal significance for the source, usually associated with reproduction such as sperm, ova 
and embryos.146 This value can be functional as well. In Dickens’ example, a recently severed 
finger would clearly still have value to its source, since it could be reattached. As long as that 
is the case, it would seem unwise to infer abandonment.147 
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Herein lies the major difficulty in determining such disputes through a discussion of the 
concept of abandonment: it is a blunt instrument that distracts from normative questions that 
are often a more appropriate grounds for determining ownership. At law, legal abandonment 
entails the abandonment of all rights in a res. But, given the personal nature of the body, this 
seems like overkill. If I have lost de facto physical control over a blood sample which 
contains information pertaining to my health and my entire genetic code, or of a sperm 
sample which contains such genetic information in readily utilisable form, it seems 
inappropriate to conclude that I have abandoned all of my interests in the sample in question 
in the absence of explicit evidence that this was my intention. In terms of protecting patient 
interests, the value of  a property model is that it allows continuing control over the separated 
materials.148 Nonetheless, the casualness with which abandonment has been invoked by some 
commentators would tend to lend support to adopting a consent, as opposed to a property, 
model when dealing with such materials, although there are nuanced arguments for both.149 
Consent, of course, requires explicit authorisation of the type of use that is to be made of the 
material. Perhaps, a hybrid approach would be preferable 
For instance, Laurie appears to suggest that some sort of inalienable property right could be 
recognised to protect the dignity and integrity of the human person and draws an analogy 
with the protection afforded in intellectual property law to artist’s moral rights.150  This leads 
into another question obscured when such disputes are framed in the language of 
‘abandonment’. Arguably, the question is often not whether I have ‘abandoned’ the material, 
but whether certain human biological products ought to be the objects of property at all.151 
Treating such material as a res that may be abandoned like any other res ignores the question 
as to whether, in the circumstances, there is sufficient conceptual separation from the person 
who is the source of the material so that the material can appropriately be considered an 
object of property.152 Rights that pertain to the so-called ‘indivisible person’ might be better 
protected under the law of privacy or by property independent prohibitions.153 Furthermore, 
the finality implied by ‘abandonment’ would seem to offer lower protection to the source 
than adopting a consent model where specific uses of the material need to be expressly 
assented to, even sometime after separation from the person has taken place.  
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Conclusion 
There a myriad of objections to invoking the concept of abandonment to separated human 
biological materials. Much of the difficulty comes from utilising a property law concept, 
despite the failure (for the most part) of the law to recognise that the source of these materials 
has any property rights in them. Such materials are the source’s property in so far as their 
actions can be taken to have extinguished any ownership rights they had in them before being 
acquired by a hospital or research institute. However, when one inquires as to the ownership 
rights that the source abandoned, one is met with the objection that there is no property in the 
body. You can’t have your cake and eat it. While there is a failure to recognise the property 
rights of the source in the body, then it is the language of property that should be abandoned.  
There is also merit in recognising a limited form of property in separated body parts— ‘mere 
property’—that is an extension of the bodily-use freedom principle. Absurd consequences 
need not result as such items would not be the same as chattels, and would not be treated the 
same. Such an approach need not impose onerous costs on medical institutions in 
investigating ownership. Furthermore, most cases of purported abandonment in a medical 
context are more akin to a voluntary transfer as there is no ‘roll of the dice’ as to the identity 
of the next owner. The misdescription of such transfers as abandonment obscures questions 
about the agency and undue influence that are appropriately raised where a fiduciary 
personally benefits through the relationship from a gratuitous transfer of a valuable or useful 
res. Finally, it is more appropriate to determine entitlement to income rights in such materials 
by reference to nuanced normative questions concerning creator incentives, not by reference 
to the blunt instrument of abandonment.   
